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Comment
Between Law and Justice: Professor Bittker's
Case for Black Reparations*
HENRY J. RICHARDSON III**
INTRODUCTION
During a time when the United States is near the bottom of
either an economic recession or depression, it may seem fanciful and
even immoral to inquire seriously into the feasibility of paying repara-
tions to black people. Such an attitude implies that in these difficult
times even affirmative action programs are unwarranted luxuries, to
say nothing of the insanity of black reparations when money is short
for everybody. Professor Bittker was writing prior to the onset of pres-
ent economic woes and may therefore be exempted from accusations
of fantasy and immorality, though it is doubtful he would wish to be
since he seeks to present reparations as a plausible idea. However,
the authors of the subsequent mini-literature of reviews' that his work
has generated have tended to support reparations in spite of a fuller
awareness of the economic situation and, more importantly, they aug-
ment Professor Bittker's work in laying a foundation for clarifying
and hopefully resolving the complex problems which he has designated
as "the second American dilemma."2 Accordingly, certain issues in this
secondary literature will be explored briefly in conjunction with those
raised by Black Reparations. Finally an issue not considered by any
of the above-the acceptance of reparations-will fie discussed.
From the perspectives of Afro-America, perhaps it would have
been better if the first book-length legal analysis' of this subject had
* THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS. By Boris I. Bittker. New York: Random
House, 1973. Pp. 191. $7.95 [hereinafter cited as BiTTxER].
** LL.B. 1966, Yale University; LL.M. 1971, U.C.L.A.; Associate Professor of Law,
Indiana University; Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Nk'orthwestern University,
1975-1976.
1 Bell, Book Review, 9 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lim. L. RPv. 156 (1974); Guinier,
Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 1719 (1973); Jenkins, Book Review, 18 How. L.J. 247
(1973) ; Shepard, Book Review, 7 GA. L. REv. 587 (1973).
2 BlrriT at 136.
3 There have been, however, three comparatively recent legal analyses of this problem,
the latter two by the same black scholar: Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1063 (1968) ; Collins, The United States Owes Reparations to Its Black Citizens, 16
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been published by a black legal scholar. Why such a consideration should
enter the mind of a black legal scholar in the first place is based in
suspicion that even the most objectively intentioned, methodologically
balanced scholarship cannot overcome the context of historical and pres-
ent racism against black people in America. This produces the further
fear that the question of reparations, so much at the center of Afro-
America's both inchoate and structured feelings towards America,'
will be framed in a way prejudicial to those outcomes which black people
feel are deserved, if it is not explored by some scholar touched at
least somewhat in the same way. The history of black people in America
has taught that such feelings and suspicions are not irrational emotional
luxuries, but often comprise a perception, commonsense and scholarly,
of social realities which majority America would have hidden. Such is
the depth to which distrust between blacks and whites in this country
has infiltrated.
The fact is, however, that Black Reparations has not been written
by a black scholar. The fact is also that Professor Bittker has written a
book which raises too many of the difficulties involved in implementing
a reparations scheme to satisfy those who want reparations paid to-
morrow, but which also sympathizes with the essential justice of the
idea too much to satisfy people who view it as embodying the worst
excesses of the modern welfare state. In other words, it is a most useful
book, raising the legal issues in the fine tradition of scholarly balance.
It is a book about the law, and as such it may contribute to
general and personally felt frustrations about the entire subject, not-
withstanding personal commitments to legal scholarship. The idea of
black people getting reparations for past wrongs-wrongs taken by
most Afro-Americans as a fact of present existence-is an idea of
justice which, accordingly, transcends the legal process, though ideally
the former parallels the latter. But to discuss reparations as an idea of
justice within the framework of American law is necessarily to confine
the idea in a cage of both tight and suspicious construction. It is tight
because the precise and disciplined constraints of legal inquiry often
exclude factors of power and wealth that shape legal process,5 and
suspicious because American criminal law, at least, has historically
served and arguably continues to serve as much as an instrument of the
How. L.J. 82 (1970) ; Collins, The United States Owes Reparations to the African Statesfor the Slave Trade, 16 How. L.J. 314 (1971).
4 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 3 supra; see generally D. BELL, RAcE, RACISm AND
AMmUcAN LAW 562-63 (1973) ; Guinier, supra note 1, at 1720-21.
5 Cf. Bell, supra note 1, at 157-58, 165.
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oppression of blacks as it has been their protector.6 Nor have other
areas of American legal process been, from time to time, above suspicion
in this regard. This suspicion must be retained as a sounding-board for
all issues concerning reparations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive
that any possible system of reparations could ever be implemented
nationally other than under legal process.' Since we are generally
stuck with such inconveniences, it is better they should be raised sys-
tematically, as Professor Bittker has done.
The Case for Black Reparations is timely in the context of not
only American happenings, but relative to current events in the inter-
national arena as well. Generally, this book discus,.es legal expectations
about resource allocation between a "have" group, and a "have-not"
group, specifically black people in America. The latter are not only an
economically deprived American group, but they share this status of
comparative deprivation with the majority of their kinfolk in African
lands (or, for that matter, elsewhere). Establishing arrangements for
just and effective resource allocation towards black people not only
defines a frontier of legal expectations in America but also an analogous
frontier in international legal process.' The Caracas Conference on the
Law of the Sea in Spring-Summer 1974 and Summer 1975 in Vienna,9
and the recent special session of the United Nations General Assembly
on economic problems of the developing countries,"0 are only two par-
ticular international arenas, out of many, where the basic question of
how much of the world's resources will be available to Africa and other
developing lands is being systematically confronted. This question
is further confronted in the context of a sudden shift of wealth to oil-
producing countries (including Nigeria), raising questions as to how
this redistribution of trade, aid, and influence might be arranged ac-
6 D. BELL, supra note 4, at 857-83.
7In this connection, however, the example of Woodstock rcturns to haunt us, in that
over 200,000 people assembled for several days without disorder and exhibited a remark-
able amount of cooperation. This raises the question as to whether the apparatus of legal
institutions is necessary in all cases to carry out a social program, including black repara-
tions. Bittker's response would seem to be (1) that the legal system is needed to re-
dress the effects of "legally" imposed segregation, see BIrricu at 13-17; cf. id. at 95-96,
and (2) that the law possesses adequate resources to do the job. Bell especially dis-
agrees with (2), while noting that much present affirmative action federal court-ordered
relief might now be viewed as "quasi-reparational." Bell, stpra note 1, at 164.
a See generally Richardson, Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to
the Needs of Black Southern Africa, 1 UFAHAMU, Spring 1970, at 22; see also Collins,
supra note 3, at 314; cf. BlrrKuR at 86, 87.
o See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975).
10 See 11 UNITED NATIONS MONTHLY CHRONICLE, May 1974, at 33, 66-84.
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cording to legal expectations and duties. Reparations-type arguments,
on the basis of alleged past corporate wrongs and excessive profits, have
been made in some third world countries, by the way of set-off claims,
and in negotiations over the amount of compensation the nationalizing
government owes to former Western corporate owners of nationalized
property. Analogous issues in the United States, following the civil
rights legislative and judicial successes of the sixties, revolve around
blacks securing increased influence and wealth relative to, among other
things, land, banks, federal benefits, access to major markets, and par-
ticipation in corporate power. Economic resource reallocation con-
stitutes the frontier of legal development for black people, then, both
internationally and in America, since in both communities black people
have generally secured in legislative and judicial arenas important politi-
cal and civil rights to be free from white-inspired racial discriminination.
In both communities, it is a tense question whether the above rights will
in effect be confirmed by necessarily concomitant rights for black people,
as national and encapsulated groups as well as individuals, to enjoy
realistic economic opportunities, wealth, and influence.
In exploring the rights under law of Afro-Americans to reparations
from majority America, and in seeking partial guidance from major
implemented European reparations plans,"- Professor Bittker seems to
sense this global tension between issues of equitable resource allocation
and those of rational legal decisionmaking. In connecting with the
above trends, this book continues a most timely inquiry about the role of
law as the cutting edge of both national and international social change.
STRUCTURE AND ARGUMENTS
At the risk of some injustice to a book so rich in issues, it is useful
here to briefly summarize its arguments. After stating the need for
analysis instead of emotion relative to black reparations and his in-
tention to provide it, Professor Bittker presents the case for compensa-
tion. The injustice for which compensation may be owed is not limited
to slavery, nor to subsequent federal or state official misconduct, but ex-
tends to the "fallout of official action upon the economic, political, and
social life of the country."' 2 Black reparations "would serve to redress
injuries suffered under a legal system that was held by Brown v. Board
of Education to violate the Constitution."'" But he is prepared as a
11 E.g., Brr KER at 61.
12 Id. at 24, 8-24.
13 Id. at 23.
[Vol. 50:517
BLACK REPARATIONS
working hypothesis "to accept the theory that statutes, ordinances, and
other official actions have been the predominant source of racial dis-
crimination."" His willingness to accept that hypothesis stems from
two reasons: first, we have no way of producing a model of the United
States as it would have been if "unalloyed personal preference had been
allowed full sway after slavery was abolished";"5 and second, this
premise provides a justification for publicly financed reparations to the
victims of discrimination, even though some of the damage may stem
from "private" behavior that might have occurred in the absence of
official encouragement or even in violation of official prohibitions. 6
Because of the systematic, officially enforced nature of racial dis-
crimination, Professor Bittker argues that the case for damages is not
limited to judicially cognizable remedies but rather moves into the field
of legislative discretion. Under the legislative approach it would not
be necessary to find a constitutional right to compensation for govern-
mental misconduct (though he rightly notes17 that the traditional diffi-
culty of overcoming this requirement in the judicial context may have
been mitigated by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation),"s nor to require a comprehensive
program of damages for every species of official misconduct." Con-
gress has in the past recognized equitable wrongs beyond those sanc-
tioned by positive legislation and court opinions, and it might well use
the ideal of "fair and honorable dealings" in passing,3 on the reasonable-
ness of the demand for black reparations.'
He then argues that a civil rights action under section 19832" is
an example of existing law providing compensation for governmental
misconduct that invades the citizen's constitutional rights; accord-
ingly the concept of black reparations is far from bizarre or unprece-
dented. Although usually indemnity is paid for behavior that was
wrong as judged by the generally accepted law when committed, it is
quite possible to formulate legal strategies that go beyond this practice
and redress injuries attributable to acts thought to be legal when com-
" Id. at 25-26. In this connection, he finds racial discrimiration institutionalized so
continually in terms of violations of constitutional rights as to provide a potentially
stronger claim than the case for compensating the victims of poverty or miscarriages of
criminal justice. Id. at 24.
" Id. at 25.
16 Id. at 26.
'17Id. at 20-21.
Is 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
19 Brrrmx at 21.
20Id. at 22.
2142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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mitted, if they are condemned by a later change in legal or constitu-
tional doctrine." Applied to segregation, this latter approach would
suggest the payment of compensation for state-prescribed segregation
in public schools and other public facilities. Further, compensation for
violations of the "separate but equal" doctrine is even more consonant
with prevailing rules, since these violations were legally wrong even
when committed.2
A program of compensation limited to actual violations of the
"separate but equal" doctrine and to official segregation would be far
from comprehensive. Millions of blacks who were not directly subject
to formal segregation in the South felt the pervasive impact of official
discrimination by the federal government and by states and other
governmental agencies in the North. A program of black reparations
that excluded these blacks would be unfair, but to include them would
create still other problems. Individual reparations could not be pro-
vided by the government without an official code of racial classification,
while group reparations would entail a process of official favor to some
black organizations and disfavor to others. Because both routes are
fraught with dangers, he uses the term "a second American dilemma"
to describe the current situation.24
A thesis so wide-ranging raises many issues, in the words of
Myres McDougal, of both public order and constitutive significance."
Given that it is impossible to even mention them all, our interest here is
limited to selected issues of constitutive significance, i.e., those illuminat-
ing the basic value arrangements of the community. This choice is con-
siderably facilitated by Professor Bell's thorough critique of Professor
Bittker's discussion of section 1983, the related cases, and especially the
issues of standing, i.e., the public order considerations. Taking the
book as a whole, Professor Bittker has anticipated the major and cer-
tainly most of the minor legal issues involved, giving the reader a
22 See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J.
5, 29 n.96 (1974).2 3 BrKrER at 135-36.
24 Id. at 136.
25 See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constituitive Process of Authori-
tative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LG.AL ORDER 73 (R. Falk &
C. Black eds. 1969).
26 Bell, supra note 1, at 158-62. Bell's basic objection is that Bittker passes too
quickly over difficulties that threaten litigants' standing to bring damages claims under
section 1983 before even getting to the merits, especially on the issue of reaching muni-
cipal officials for damages. From this discussion Bell concludes that section 1983 is be-
coming less, not more, promising as a basis of reparational relief against states. See in
this connection the alternative bases of jurisdiction he suggests. Id. at 159 n.14. See also
Collins, supra note 3, at 88-95.
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sense of completeness and freedom to ponder his treatment of them,
without the hindrance of first having to intellectually mop up after the
scholar by raising missing issues. He does not provide a dispositive
resolution of all of them, and therefore his argument for litigational
purposes tends to be somewhat thin, as Professor Bell has noted." On
the other hand, it is intellectually valuable to lay ofit entire conceptions
towards a desired goal in an integral form, notwithstanding the risks
of collapse of some of its component elements. To the extent that one's
view of the validity of intellectual inquiry adheres closely to that
which must be rigorously and empirically demonstrated, Professor
Bittker's willingness to push on beyond potentially fatal litigational
pitfalls is utopian. But to the extent that his overall argument of legal
feasibility is utopian, it may thereby help create what Professor Bell
and implicitly all the reviewers have noted as the need for a sustaining
vision to energize the legal process towards the goal of delivering rep-
arations." Obviously, however, if the argument suffers from too many
flaws it may be too utopian to serve even the latter purpose; but that
answer can await future inquiries.
Refreshingly, Professor Bittker has heeded some of the lessons,
now a part of the Black Experience, of the long collective civil rights
litigation and has confronted those legal arguments that would other-
wise be especially useful to opponents of black reparations who cloak
their opposition in appeals to higher constitutional principles. Thus
he meets head on the argument that the one time legality of the Plessy
doctrine provides a just rationale for now denying reparations;2" he
goes beyond the fourteenth amendment "state& action" limitation in-
stead of trying to torture that poor doctrine into the grave ;30 he quickly
arrives at and disposes of the issue of voluntary black segregation as
mitigating claims for reparations for white racial discrimination;1 he
confronts two likely first-line excuses as to why no reparations plan at
all would be needed: "We will repeal the relevant unconstitutional
laws," "We will quickly clean up conditions of existing discrimina-
tion" ;2 he argues that school board members could validly be held to
be on notice from the course of pre-Brown Supreme Court decisions
and therefore had reason to believe, vis-A-vis a pre-Brown injury, that
27 Bell, supra note 1, at 157.
2.9 Id. at 165.
29 BirrxK at 22.
30 Id. at 26.
31 Id. at 28-29.
32 Id. at 34.
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segregation was legally improper as being "unequal" under Plessy, and
accordingly could no longer shield themselves behind good-faith de-
fenses;3 with respect to a possible finding of state liability under sec-
tion 1983, by reversing presumptions, he lays the basis for excluding
as too speculative the inevitable protestations that the injury was wholly
private in nature unaffected by any state behavior, or that other states
contributed to the aggregate injury. 4 These points suffer from some of
the difficulties raised by Professor Bell, but the important thing is that
they are raised and discussed with some awareness of how contending
anti-reparations forces will use them, instead of resort being had to a
false neutrality that assumes the initial equal innocence of all claims.
A PREMATURE ComPLETION
Before continuing, it is pertinent to see what the book does not
do, or at least what Professor Bittker did not intend it to do. Signifi-
cant here is a comparison of the book's second chapter, "The Case for
Compensation," with the last, "Black Reparations, Justice, and Social
Welfare." In the former he explores the legal justification for making
special claims on behalf of black people, concludes that such claims
are not yet under present law barred by the passage of time, but notes
explicitly that the entire inquiry presupposes an American society
"that is prepared to respond to the most meritorious of these claims
rather than dismissing all of them as man's ineluctable fate" (it is
not clear here whether he refers to claims of past injustices generally, or
of black reparations specifically)." The last chapter, on the other hand,
finds that the massive national expenditures required for any program
of reparations going beyond mere symbolism must inevitably compete
with, and be weighed against all other demands on public funds in the
federal budget. He then concludes:
In deciding whether black reparations should be given priority
over education, foreign aid, or income support, and whether these
government expenditures are preferable to lower taxes, the
citizen must look to his own fundamental values. Moreover, since
the amount that could be spent for any of these causes is elastic,
he must go beyond a mere ranking of the categories by allocating
dollar amounts to each line. If I were to offer such a budget to
the reader without discussing the merits of each of the competing
claims (a task beyond the intended scope of this work), it would
be only an arbitrary presentation of my own social and political
a3 Id. at 42-43.
841d. at 65.
35 Id. at 27.
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preference, expressed in financial terms. I content myself, there-
fore, with the hope that this preliminary inquiry vwill aid the reader
in fitting the concept of black reparations into his own hierarchy of
values38
This is a disappointing moment in the book. Having in effect based
the book on the fundamental axiom of the ultimate defeat of racism
in the American character by the realistic possibility of reparations
actually being paid, he declines to explicitly test, or even speculate on
the same point when he is inevitably led back to it, though elsewhere
in the book he does engage in the kind of enlightened speculation and
guesswork by which the best of scholars advance our understanding.
It is disappointing because for Afro-America this is precisely the crunch-
ing, tension-and-rage-producing, generally debilitating dilemma:
whether America is ultimately racist against black people, therefore
necessitating the incorporation of certain stark inevitabilities into Afro-
American expectations about the future, or alternately, whether in-
deed there is hope on which optimism and action can be based that black
people will get what is justly theirs through some process of decision-
making in the society. Most if not all concerted Afro-American think-
ing about both individual survival and public policy begins with this
dilemma, and is followed by some inchoate or assumed provisional
resolution of it prior to any consideration of subsequent issues. This
dilemma is not and cannot be perceived by Afro-Americans as repre-
senting "just another" competing claim in the American political proc-
ess; rather, it is the constant screen through which black people are
forced to pull the entire process.
My hope was not for Professor Bittker to resolve it, but only to
face it squarely in the same manner as he does most other issues in the
inquiry, in his same announced spirit of stimulating a national debate.
One stated aim of his quest was to see if lawyer, using the tools of
their trade could clarify the implications of black reparations." It seems
that if the question is transposed to ask whether the same people can
use the same tools to clarify the fundamental assumption that underpins
an inquiry into reparations, Professor Bittker's answer is negative."8
2 Id. at 135.
37 Id. at 7.
3S A judicial answer that closely relates to this question without actually answering
it is beginning to emerge out of recent recession-relevant cases presenting the general
issue of whether labor contract seniority provisions are superior to the law on equal
employment opportunities with respect to the order in which an employer is to lay off
and recall workers. A recent important decision on these issues, Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), held, inter alia, that
Wisconsin Steel's (one of the joined defendants) employment seniority system embody-
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, he eschews facing this dilemma in part for the wrong
reasons. The practical effect of the "hierarchy of values" of the in-
dividual citizen is not nearly as crucial as is the ongoing exclusion of
black people from critical national budget-making decisions. There is a
real question as to whether an overt claim for effective black reparations
would even survive long enough to reach the stage within the govern-
ment where it would be honestly balanced on the merits against other
national priorities, and have some minimum realistic chance of being
included within the federal budget. It is this issue that could have been
explored in manageable form as the logical next step, without getting
into the morass of the merits of each budgetary item, and certainly
without immediately and solely resorting to the individual consciences
of people on the street. Such a discussion would have been a meaning-
ful contribution to the needed national debate. As it is, a fundamental
axiom of the inquiry remains hidden in its own ghetto.
THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Chapters Ten, "Identifying the Beneficiaries," and Eleven, "The
Constitutionality of Black Reparations" taken together present a ques-
tion of some importance. In the former, Professor Bittker raises the
issue of how to determine who is "black" for the purposes of effectively
paying reparations. He notes that racial classification is not a new art
in the American system,"s and surmises that imperatives of rational
administration might drive the federal government to adopt a formal
code of racial classification similar to that in South Africa." Such a
code, he concludes, would be more likely to reinforce and sharpen
polarization than to reduce racial separation because of the pressures
generated by governmental intervention on this basis. It could lead to
a "Balkanization of the racial map" ;41 it would tend by virtue of official
reliance on racial distinctions (e.g., percentage of African blood) to
pit subgroups of Afro-America against each other. While some of these
problems might be alleviated by adopting a strategy of group rather
ing the "last hired, first fired" principle of seniority is not of itself racially discrimina-
tory, nor does it have the effect of perpetuating prior racial discrimination in violation of
Title VII, but that it might have "potentially discriminatory impact," and that an amend-
ing agreement reinstating contract recall rights to three white workers was discrimina-
tory. Id. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in another case hopefully to
resolve the conflict between such seniority systems and Title VI. Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1421 (March
25, 1975).
39 BiTTm at 93.
40 Id. at 97.
41 Id. at 99.
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than individual reparations, such a strategy is ultirnately unequal to the
task because, for various reasons, 2 it would require a host of arbitrary
choices among organizations competing for participation.43 If his dis-
cussion has a germ of truth within it, his dilemma may apply to both
majority and Afro-America:
It is the justice of reparations when viewed in the large, coupled
with these perils of administering a program in the concrete, that
lead me to perceive this area as the focus of the second American
Dilemma."
In chapter Eleven, Professor Bittker asks: does the Constitution
permit the federal government to establish and finance a program of
reparations whose benefits would go to black citizens exclusively? The
resulting stimulating discussion begins with the notion of a "colorblind"
Constitution, and includes the discussion of three pre-Brown hypo-
thetical appellate opinions on the constitutionality of a "checkerboard"
housing ordinance that are contrasted with post-Brown issues and prob-
lems. 5 Chief among the latter is the propriety of racial distinctions and
percentages in governmental action, especially following Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education." He holds out some hope
that while the Supreme Court might forbid the courts to make the
necessary racial distinctions directly,'7 it "might well hold that a pro-
gram of black reparations was within the discretionary authority of the
people's representatives."' s Doubts as to this eventuality remain, how-
ever, which stem from the failure of the Supreme Court thus far to
seize "the nettle of individual racial classifications."' 9 A second doubt
stems from his conclusion
that the program, even if otherwise constitutionally acceptable,
would have to be corrective, imposing racial restrictions only to
cure the evils stimulating their adoption. This 'would imply that
the program's benefits, time scale, and other characteristics would
be subject to a residual power of judicial review lest its racial
qualifications outlive their justification. 0
He concludes the time is distant indeed when this latter action could
42Id. at 100-01.
'3 Id. at 102-03.
4' Id. at 104.
4Id. at 109-15.
46 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971) ; Brrmm at 116-17.
47 Brrzm. at 121.
48Id.
4 Id. at 125.
gold. at 125-26.
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justifiably be taken, though, should it happen, "a judicial verdict re-
jecting the program's constitutionality would not be a judgment on its
fairness or wisdom."'" Inevitably, however, in my opinion, it would
indeed be overwhelmingly perceived by the American public as such a
judgment."
These two chapters raise squarely the question of the continuing
utility of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the critical concerns of Afro-America, especially as that clause re-
tains at its core the concept of a "colorblind" Constitution. This con-
cept is rightfully and inevitably to be illuminated by both the earlier
slave-holding version of the same Constitution, and with the history of
harm to black people from almost 400 years of racism in this country.
Has that concept outlived its judicial and litigational utility to black
people when it now threatens to block the transfer of resources to
Afro-America which are theirs under a claim of justice ?13
To his credit, Professor Bittker perceives this question of utility
on both its strategic and constitutional merits. Thus in discussing color-
blindness in the Constitution on the basis of justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy as endorsed in Brown v. Board of Education, he asks:
Can these generalizations, founded on the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also on a more basic theory
of democracy, be squared with racial distinctions having a com-
pensatory purpose? Or do they confine governmental actions to
the elimination of racial disparities for the future, requiring us
to let bygones be bygones ?"
The issue is more precisely drawn at the conclusion of chapter
Eleven:
51ld, at 126.
52 An indicator in this respect is the recent shift following DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974), dampening public support for compensatory higher education ad-
missions opportunities for minorities.
53 Alternatively, the related issue could be raised of whether recent affirmative action
decisions, some of which Professor Bell has called "quasi-reparational," Bell, supra note
1, at 164, under the equal protection clause represent a trend of interpretation culminating
in a clause ultimately supporting reparations payments (at least in case-by-case litigation)
to black people per se while somehow still justifying it under remnants of a colorblind
principle. The plausibility of this eventuality is the rightful subject of a separate exten-
sive inquiry, see note 58 infra, and no opinion is expressed on it here. However, if we
assume that the clause does ultimately acquire such an interpretation, the possibility
arises of a then subsequent and early federal judicial "backlash" whittling down the
clause from that principle, perhaps down towards a new interpretation of "color blindness"
promising less constitutional support for reparations to black people exclusively. Argu-
ably, a semblance of this "backlash" has occurred vis-i-vis black people with respect to
state action under the fourteenth amendment. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972) ; cf. D. BEnL, supra note 4, at 219-57.
r, BiTTKER at 108.
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In Chapter 10 I set out my misgivings about the use of a racial
code and individual racial classifications in a program of black
reparations, as well as my parallel doubts about the use of black
groups as conduits or intermediaries. If these dangers are as sub-
stantial as I have suggested, they would not be eliminated by a
judicial decision upholding such a program's conctitutionality.5
This returns us to the earlier discussion of the dichotomy between
reparations as an idea of law and as an idea of justice." It does so
especially if we take Professor Bittker's argument3 in these two chap-
ters as being more often than not correct when he states that to imple-
ment a program of individualized reparations would require some kind
of formal federally-administered racial code that in turn ultimately
would produce more injustice and oppression than currently obtains,
regardless of its constitutionality. Whether or not le is right is the core
of the dilemma for black lawyers and Afro-America generally.
It is a commonplace that the due process and especially the equal
protection clauses have served Black America well in the courts in this
century, though the road yet to travel is long. WVe may go further,
even, to say that these provisions have served as both a bulwark in
selected areas against worse racial abuse, and as a sword to help selec-
tively eliminate racism long entrenched." The notion of an ultimately
colorblind equal protection clause should not be given up, until it is as
clear as possible that what is to be gained is not only immediately greater
but promises to endure at least as long as has the utility of the clause
as "colorblind." Does the prospect (or the certainty) of a program of
federally funded black reparations meet this test ?
55 Id. at 126-27.
&O See Hughes, supra note 4, at 1066-69, discussing justice to black people in this re-
gard on the basis of earlier work by John Rawls centered arourd the notion of fairness
in a social contractual context. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 16-1
(1968).
r7 See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1972).
51 There is here the underlying question of whether at this point there still remains
any "neutral" or "colorblind" considerations within the principle of equality in American
law to give up, should a system of black reparations come to be instituted. One argu-
ment to the contrary might hold that the lack of effective enforcement of Brown and
post-Brown decisions illustrates the impossibility of even theoretically talking about
equality for Afro-Americans. I would agree with the underlying premise that equal
protection has only been sporadically enforced in fact, but would maintain that the ex-
istence of the theoretical principle on the constitutional level and in federal statutes, and
available therefore as the basis of numerous Afro-Americar counterclaims against
business-as-usual, has in that respect kept Afro-America from being as legally vulner-
able as it might otherwise have been to racist practices. Things could always be somewhat
worse.
A second argument to the contrary might be that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), in precluding use of employer evaluations with a discriminatory impact,
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The definitive answer as to Professor Bittker's assertion that the
payment of reparations on other than a group basis necessitates the
imposition of a racial code on the South African model obviously can-
not finally be determined here. But it is little wonder that this is a
point on which the reviewers have manifested their impatience. Pro-
fessor Guinier, for example, feels that the necessary racial classification
could be successfully done by a series of administrative boards plus
some expanded concept of legislation as proposed by Professor Bittker,
on the basis of general analogies to present affirmative action pro-
grams ;5" Ms. Collins goes further to advocate an agency similar to the
Indian Claims Commission, in conjunction with federal referees."0
Professor Shepard might subscribe in spirit to both on the theory that
whatever errors arise will be marginal and inconsequential." One prob-
lem with these formulations is that raised for different purposes by
Professor Guinier himself: that present affimative action criteria,
especially for the transfer of economic resources, are currently generally
has generally abrogated "neutral" or "colorblind" considerations from the principle of
equality. Therefore the issue is no longer about giving up the same for the purposes of
justifying reparations, but only about what variety of racial standard is constitutionally
or otherwise desirable.
If this interpretation is adopted, it becomes relevant to note that there has not yet
been promulgated the kind of racial code suggested. One accordingly could argue that
dropping the neutral, colorblind core of the principle of equality does not inevitably-at
least in the short run-lead to the adoption of such a racial code. On the other hand, no
reparations program has yet been proposed by the federal government in the context of
which such a racial code would likely arise.
But Griggs does not appear to abrogate the colorblind principle. If anything, that
decision attempts to retain at least a remnant of the same by on the one hand rejecting
the business-as-usual argument that discrimination occurs only where there is intent to
do so, and on the other hand by resorting to the "neutral" principle of job-related evalua-
tion, should employer evaluation otherwise allowed under the EEOA have apparently dis-
criminatory impact, to ensure that the congressional intent to make race, religion, na-
tionality and sex irrelevant is carried out. Id. at 436. To be sure, the Court acknowl-
edges implicitly that past discrimination can be taken into account in interpreting the
Act, id. at 431, and the effect of this decision is to put some additional black workers into
more jobs. In this connection, Professor Bell cites Griggs for being among the cases
having "quasi-reparational effects," Bell, supra note 1, at 164 n. 36, but then draws a dis-
tinction between those effects and "direct reparations." Id. at 165. It is a valid distinc-
tion and the latter can be taken as the main topic of inquiry here.
Accordingly, it seems on balance that the principle of equality in the decisions of the
Court remains at least theoretically subject to "colorblind" considerations which would
be called into question by "direct" reparations for black people, and hence the issue of
the costs to Afro-America of giving up this principle for any benefits of reparations
remains a valid one.
19 Guinier, supra note 1, at 1722-23.
10 Collins, supra note 3, at 88-89. But see Brr-rma at 73-78.
61 Cf. Shepard, supra note 1, at 590.
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drafted in nonracial terms perhaps to mean black people but which,
intended or not, wind up covering many poor whites and other de-
prived citizens. 2 This would generally be impermissible under a pro-
gram to pay black reparations, though it is consistent with an equal
protection clause still colorblind in theory. Not only, therefore, is
there a difference in legislative strategy between affirmative action and
black reparations but a difference in the basic objective for which pay-
ment is made, rendering such facile analogies suspect.
Professor Bell, however, raises the objection to Professor Bittker's
analysis that self-certification in lieu of a racial co de would indeed be
workable. Few if any whites would fraudulently identify themselves as
black because "[t]he economic, social and psychological benefits of
whiteness in this society are highly valued by whites" and are unlikely to
be sacrificed for participation in any black reparations program.63 This
is true enough as far as the merits are concerned, but ignores the
imperatives that seem to motivate legislatures and courts based on their
assumptions about the possibility of fraud, some oi which frankly ap-
proach paranoia, when the dispensation of money especially in programs
of direct human benefit is at stake. If sums of at least $30 billion are to
be involved in any reparations program not merely symbolic, an almost
inevitable demand by the payor is going to be for art elaborate definition
of some kind setting out who is or is not entitled to be paid, with as
much precision and consistency as possible. Past experience indicates
that this demand operates independently of the merits as to whether
it is actually needed or makes sense.6" Self-certification might indeed be
workable, but it seems fanciful to think that any legislature would agree,
absent tremendous political pressure.
THE MEANING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL
This leaves us, then, with the suspicion that Professor Bittker's
point has at least a germ of validity for payment of individualized rep-
arations, and that it might even be relevant for payment to racially iden-
tifiable groups. If we proceed on this basis, the South African model,
62 Cf. Guinier, supra note 1, at 1723.
G3 See Bell, supra note 1, at 163.
64 A cogent e.xample of this demand is found in the rationale underpinning Guest
Statutes-that the passenger-plaintiff and the driver-defendant would more likely than
not "collude" in staging a "safe" accident for the purpose of frmudulently collecting in-
surance money in a situation necessarily unwitnessed by third pztrties; therefore, Guest
Statutes are needed to prevent such "probable" collusion.
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although its applicability was generally rejected by the reviewers, must
be reexamined. Should we take the model seriously enough for it to
serve as one criterion for evaluating the feasibility of any proposed
reparations program, and for aiding Afro-America to decide whether
proffered federally funded reparations payments on a national scale
should be accepted, if the tradeoff includes the rejection of the juris-
prudential principle of "color-blind" equal protection?
As inconvenient as it may be, the answer is yes. The history of
South Africa shows the relentlessly logical use of a system of racial
classifications by a white minority employing the legal system as a pri-
mary strategy65 to subjugate black people for the easier exploitation of
their labor under conditions close to those in slavery and to divert them
from the economic, landed and social benefits of the society. This
apartheid system has been continuously justified by white South Africa
as a program of "separate development" for the "benefit" of the black
African peoples because of the "cultural disparities" involved. Its per-
vasive racial oppression includes legal policies regulating individuals
(the "Pass laws") and groups (the "homelands policy"), 6 and is con-
solidated by a strong army and police force, a fully mobilized local
white militia, plus one of the most brutally effective internal security
systems in the world. 7
There is some visible emphasis internationally, and to a lesser ex-
tent in Afro-America, on formulating legal strategies to facilitate the
downfall of South Africa's domestic and exported (to the international
territory of Namibia) system of apartheid. Exported apartheid dearly
violates international law, as a recent decision of the International Court
of Justice holds.68 But Pan-African solidarity by no means exhausts the
legitimate interest of Afro-America in South Africa. Equally important
is gaining an understanding of apartheid to ascertain the conditions
under which similar oppression could arise in other countries, includ-
ing the United States, and especially an understanding of the role of
legal process in preparing and consolidating the foundation for such
65 A. MATHEWS, LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 298 (1972). Mathews'
entire book, in fact, inquires into the use by white South Africa of the legal system to
maintain a highly authoritarian apartheid state.
66 Id. at 240-52.
67 1d. at 299-301.
68 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
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pestilence."0 The South African example stands at a minimum for the
premise that an expressly racial designation enshrined in constitutive
national expectations about the allocation of power and wealth benefits
in the society can very effectively be turned into a rationale for oppres-
sing its putative beneficiaries, at least if the lawmakers are white and
the "beneficiaries" are black. There are strong indications that one
necessary if not sufficient condition for the effectiveness of this op-
pression as aided by legal process is the absence in South African law
of a constitutional principle of equality."
To dismiss the problem as of no consequence is to assume that
somehow "it can't happen here." There would seem to be no historical
or present justification for such an assumption, though we can debate
the probabilities and fervently hope that it does riot. But to embrace
the concept of a national racial classification as a matter of constitutional
law on this basis is to assume that the white majority in the United
States, if given the same doctrinal tools of law vis-A-vis the black
minority, would be destined to act in a qualitatively different manner
from the white minority in South Africa vis-A-vis the black majority.
The only basis for this assumption is a hope that it would be different,
a hope imperiled by past and recent attempts by some American law
enforcement officials looking to link black political and criminal be-
havior and then to treat it as a threat to the internal and external
security of the country.
The point is not to answer here whether the future will violate
these hopes, but only to emphasize that the South African example
should be taken seriously enough so that the desirability of a national
code of racial classifications, if that subsequently appears inevitable,
should be the subject of much informed and searching inquiry.
In this connection, recent developments in the law of the inter-
national protection of human rights provide additional harbingers of
difficulties. John Carey has aptly pointed out that the South African
apartheid example has become the subject of a double standard in that
701d. at 279-80.
'G See A. MATHEWS, supra note 65, at 279-80, for his discussion of the relationship
between apartheid and the absence of a jurisprudential principle of equality in South
African law; see also id. at 295-96 for a useful discussion of the objectives of the general
apartheid policy. And see id. at 115-32 for a comparative discussion of the constitu-
tional latitude of American versus South African courts relative to striking down or
modifying internal security legislation, especially the necessity of the former to "balance"
state interests against the preservation of individual liberties, a necessity prohibited from
South African courts.
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area of the law.7 The relevant question is whether domestic (within
national boundaries) violations of human rights are shielded from in-
ternational inquiry by Article 2(7), the domestic jurisdiction provision
of the United Nations Charter."2 The emergence of the law on point
has largely focused on the South African problem of apartheid, so that
it is reasonably clear that apartheid is not shielded by Article 2(7).
But in the process a distinction recommended as a matter of law has
emerged between apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination, in
the form of arguments that the South African case is sui generis for
the purposes of Article 2(7), which provision accordingly remains intact
for shielding other varieties of racial discrimination from international
inquiry in other discriminating countries."' The attempt is to make
South Africa somewhat of a legal whipping boy to forestall more ex-
pansive interpretations of Article 2(7). Western, including Soviet,
political convenience obviously plays a major role here, and some third-
world countries share the same convenience. Such arguments cannot
be now said to have attained the status of a principle of international
law. The lesson for our purposes, however, is that the enshrining into
legal process of assumptions that South African apartheid "can't happen
here" may well produce presumptions of law cutting against inquiry
into, and abolition of, other varieties of racial discrimination against
black people in other contexts under the jurisdiction of the same legal
system. The emergence of such sui generis conclusions of law would
appear undesirable from the vantage point of Afro-America securing
maximum protection within American legal process, yet this would
seem to be the net effect of adopting a code of racial classification under
the fourteenth amendment.
DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATIONS BY PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS
If after due deliberation of the foregoing issues we assume that
reparations conceivably might be paid, an equally important consider-
ation remains. The question of which obligations formerly owed to
Afro-America by majority America will be expected by the latter to
be acknowledged as discharged is significant in that it focuses on the
post-reparations future of Afro-America. This consideration arises
71 J. CAREY, UN PROTECrION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 143-53 (1970).
72The provision reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
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whatever the rationale for reparations: damages paid for past tortious
wrongs, redress made for prior uncompensated benefits to majority
America analogous to unjust enrichment, or compensation for property
deprived without due process of law.74 The related question is how,
after reparations are paid (or during the period that they are being
paid), obligations of majority America to Afro-America will as a matter
of law and policy differ from pre-reparations obligations and expecta-
tions. These questions have not been raised by Professor Bittker nor
his reviewers, but they are critical for clarifying community expecta-
tions of both law and justice in this area of inquiry.
Analysis of this question raises the basic issue of whether rep-
arations should be accepted by Afro-America even if they are offered.
This is different from asking whether reparations under basic standards
of justice and fairness are owed."5 It does not necessarily follow from
that premise that once owed they should automatically be accepted. There
is the possibility that, once obligations were considered discharged upon
acceptance, a new relationship between black people, as a people and as
individuals, and America would result that might produce more op-
pression than currently exists. I note no diminution of the basic obli-
gation of reparations because of this possibility, nor do I recommend
that such reparations not be accepted. But the potential ramifications
of the acceptance of such offered resources is a separate issue that must
be decided on its own merits.
Most of the reviewers manifested great and understandable im-
patience with Professor Bittker's work, stemming from their commit-
ment to the premise of reparations being paid, and from their frustra-
tion with the problems that he raises relative to implementing the
same." Some impatience showed in statements implying that his inquiry
in the final analysis constituted one more example of obstructionist
reasoning as to why yet again America could not, for "good" reasons,
fulfill its obligations to black people. 7 These were coupled with further
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII.
73 j. CAI y, supra note 71. Cf. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodcsia and the United Na-
tions: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Ail. J. INTL L. 1 (1968).
74 See notes 81-89 infra & text accompanying. See also Collins, mtpra note 3, at
96-113.
75 As should be clear by now, I subscribe, as do all of the other reviewers to date,
and implicitly Professor Bittker, to the proposition that such reparations are owed.
71 See Bell, supra note 1, at 156-57, 165; Guinier, supra note 1, at 1722-23; Shepard,
supra note 1, at 589-90.
77 See Bell, supra note 1, at 165.
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observations to the effect that since America has been operating more or
less successfully on the basis of administering racial distinctions implic-
itly and explicity for the past 400 years, it should present little problem to
find a workable scheme for paying reparations, especially if the requisite
political voltage is mobilized behind the effort."8
In terms of the actual contexts in the American political arena in
which Professor Bittker's discussion of the problems are likely to be
invoked, such impatience is likely well-founded, though recent judicial
decisions awarding significant reparational payments to specific groups
of black and women workers must be considered. 9 But the above issue
of whether reparations should be accepted by Afro-America simply
because they are owed and offered stands, whether the grounds for such
impatience prove true or not. It stands because of the inevitability of a
post-reparations change in the relationship between majority America
and Afro-America, and because of the possibility that their payment
could serve as the foundation for a new system of dependency more
onerous than before on Afro-America vis-A-vis the federal government
and majority America. 0 This of course is not to say that such a dire
possibility will inevitably come about, but only that the payment of
reparations is not an innocent act, should not be assumed as such, and
that this issue should be included as an integral part of the debate that
Professor Bittker is calling for throughout the nation, and especially in
the councils of Afro-America.
ACCEPTANCE AND THE BASIS FOR REPARATIONS
It is obviously impossible to resolve here the issues involved in the
acceptance of national reparations payments, and no such attempt is
being made. But it is equally obvious that those issues relate directly
to the rationale of such reparations as are proposed: for which past
wrongs would reparations be seen as compensating Black America?
Professor Bittker discussed this question at some length, and his con-
clusions warrant our attention.
78 See Shepard, supra note 1, at 589-90; cf. Bell, supra note 1, at 157-58.79 E.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nor. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 2 CCH Emi'. PRAc. GUM
1 9997 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 1975); Agreement, A.T.&T., E.E.O.C. & United States Dep't
of Labor, 1 CCH Emp. PRAc. GUIDE 1860, at 1533-3 (Jan. 18, 1973).80 Lessons from systems of dependency established by foreign aid programs of the
United States and other industrialized nations to developing countries, and from the
trade-off incorporated in American urban welfare programs of detailed state regulation of
one's personal life as a condition of receiving material benefits, cannot be ignored in con-
nection with reparations payments.
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Are reparations owed for the subjection of black people to slavery
prior to the Emancipation Proclamation? For various reasons Professor
Bittker concludes that reparations claims must basically rest on more
"recent" abuses to black people subsequent to the formal termination of
slavery."1 This conclusion has its unfortunate implications because, as
Professor Bell has correctly noted, the exclusion of slavery from the
basis of reparations deprives the entire general claim of a considerable
amount of moral force. 2 This exclusion furnishes an additional touch-
stone of the distinction between considerations of law and those of
justice, since the reasons for excluding slavery are largely those of pre-
serving the possibility of making a valid claim in law for wrongs sub-
sequently committed.83 In any case, Professor Bittker's discussion im-
plies that obligations owed to black people for their treatment during
slavery would not be discharged by payment of reparations, while
simultaneously implying that such obligations might well not be per-
ceptible under current American law and therefore under any program
of reparations administered through that law.
The decision to concentrate the search for compensable wrongs
in the post-slavery period leads to further issues as to the exact actions
to be causally related to such wrongs. As noted previously, Professor
Bittker adopts, as a working hypothesis, the proposition that statutes,
ordinances and other official actions have been the predominant source
of racial discrimination.84 We may suspect, should large sums of money
be involved, that arguments will be made by the payors that all current
injury stemmed from official actions, and that paying reparations dis-
charges any obligation to further compensate for any harm either at-
tributable to the period prior to the cut-off date or currently existing
on that date. Professor Bittker's formula does not take explicit account
of the persistent fourteenth amendment problem of finding some legal
rationale to compensate for purely private actions of anti-black discrim-
ination, as he has implied in anoather context,85 and as was further noted
by Ms. Jenkins in her review."6 It follows that, notwithstanding the
81 BIrYm at 10-12. It may also make a considerable difference in the actual amount
owed. For example, a black group and an economic historian Eeparately calculated the
present day value of "unpaid black equity in the slave industry" at between $448 and
$995 billion. Id. at 9.
S2 Bell, supra note 1, at 158.
33 BirTK.R at 9-26.
84 Id. at 26. See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
85 BITKm at 26.
88 Jenkins, supra note 1, at 248.
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payor arguments, the obligation of majority America to compensate
Afro-America for injury from purely private actions might not be dis-
charged by the official payment of reparations. As was noted previously,
Professor Bittker confronted this problem by arguing for a shifting
of the burdens of evidence and pleading to link private actions to official
behavior.17 There is substantial doubt as to whether this strategy would
be strong enough to stave off much acriminious debate as to what
current injury stemmed from past official versus past private actions,
in part because any identity between private and official actions could
be used to support payor's argument that compensation by officials dis-
charges obligations for harm by private actions. Should this debate be-
come the focal point the situation would not be much advanced beyond
where is is today.8s Further, to the extent that Professor Bittker's
working hypothesis and subsequent conclusions hold up," the upshot
could be another case of an obligation owed in justice for injuries from
private actions before the cut-off date, but not perceptible under any
law by which reparations would be administered.
To the extent that Professor Bittker advocates reparations as a
federal task most appropriate for congressional solution, there are
further possibilities stemming from his suggested congressional standard
of "fair and honorable dealings."9 " In addition to the discharge of
obligations problem the question of activities by private persons still
remains, though Professor Bittker's suggestion in this regard is per-
tinent. "Fair and honorable dealings" is a more inclusive standard than
"official actions," meaning that the range of past injury claimed to be
compensated for will be wider, the list of discharged obligations more
complete, and the presumption stronger that Afro-America is on an
even par with majority America subsequent to the payment of repara-
tions. If this presumption becomes the subject of judicial and legislative
notice as a matter of public policy in post-reparations decisionmaking,
subsequent federal and state policies towards Afro-America would be
harsher than today to the extent that the actual injury done over the
course of almost 400 years to black people and the post-reparations
s1 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
88 But see Professor Bittker's suggestion on this point that private action would be
linked to official action under a "fallout theory." Id. at 24-25.
89 The best analysis of Professor Bittker's discussion of cases is found in Bell,
supra note 1, at 158-62; see also Guinier, supra note 1, at 1720.
90 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
[Vol. 50:517
BLACK REPARATIONS
continuing consequences thereof are in fact unaccounted for in the cal-
culation of payments to be made. Such an accounting would arguably be
hindered as much as aided by the vagueness of the congressional stand-
ard. An obligation to compensate would remain, but the legal process
would be foreclosed from meeting it. This possibility would seem to put
a premium on an accounting method for calculating the injury done
and thus the amount owed, which rests on some notion of historical
determinism rather than on more discontinuous or electic theories. But
eclecticism rather than determinism appears to predominate in Ameri-
can historiography, raising the further possibility of such a reparations
methodology being attacked as invalid and having therefore to be de-
fended as valid for this particular purpose.
CONCLUSION
The rich stimulation of Professor Bittker's work is valuable not
only, as suggested by Professor Bell, as a path for inquiry once--or if-
the nation moves politically to decide that reparations are owed and
should be paid," but also because of two additional factors. First, the
book as a legal inquiry about a potentially massive reallocation of re-
sources from the "haves" to a group of "have-nots" links Afro-America
by yet another tie to analogous international trends. This linkage con-
tributes to greater ultimate understanding in projecting future alter-
natives for Afro-America. And secondly, the weakness of the book in
incompletely exploring the dichotomy between law and justice relative
to reparations, plus its strength in systematically raising the issues of
logic, law, and public policy that must be faced in one form or another if
reparations are to mean more than a few tokens, both serve very well
to remind all American citizens that reparations, no more than any other
single "solution," are neither the Messiah leading to the Promised
Land nor the definitive national "program" to eliminate injustice be-
tween black and white people. Such ease is not of this world.
The national debate called for by Professor Bit ker began as early
as 1829,12 but his work suggests that majority Americans in positions
of authority might become ready to listen. "Debate" is somewhat a
misnomer here, for it implies that the loser will accept defeat with
equanimity or at least retain the belief that the rules were fair. As the
reviewers have well shown, however, the question of the real priority
01 Bell, supra note 1, at 165.
92 Guinier, mepra note 1, at 1721.
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of black reparations within the national framework is far more com-
pelling than is implied by reducing it to one of comparative budgetary
expenditures. It goes to the very idea of Afro-America, and therefore
tests the idea of America, and not least that of law doing justice in
America.
